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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model of sovereign default and contagion for small
open economies that have common risk averse international investors. The financial
links generated by these investors explain the endogenous determination of credit lim-
its, capital flows, and the risk premium in sovereign bond prices. In equilibrium, these
variables are a function of both an economy’s own fundamentals and the fundamentals
of other economies. The model replicates the Wealth and Portfolio Recomposition
channels of contagion, and identifies another channel: the Risk Diversification chan-
nel of contagion. Quantitatively, the model is consistent with the contagion of the
Argentinean crisis to Uruguay.
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1 Introduction
In the last several decades, the world has witnessed several financial crises that have
occurred simultaneously across countries. Examples include the Debt Crisis of 1982,
the Mexican Crisis of 1994, the Asian Crises in 1997, the Russian Crisis of 1998, and
more recently the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the Euro-debt Crisis in 2011. While
the simultaneity of crises could be explained by the occurrence of a common shock
to several economies, contagion is another plausible explanation, and the one this
paper will focus on. Contagion corresponds to the transmission of a negative income
or financial shock from one economy to other economies. The empirical literature
that looks at the simultaneity of crisis is quite large, and evidence of contagion in
sovereign bond markets is considerable.1
The current paper is concerned with advancing an endogenous theory of contagion
of financial crises based on financial links between economies. Countries are linked
financially when they have common investors. The emphasis on financial links is
strongly supported in the empirical literature.2
The model in this paper studies financial market links across countries in a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) setting where the stochastic processes
of the emerging economies’ bond prices are endogenously determined. The model ex-
tends the literature in endogenous sovereign risk in order to consider sovereign bond
markets in a multi-country framework.3 This type of model allows for an endoge-
nous determination of the price of one period non-contingent discount bonds as a
function of the economy’s default risk. Through the consideration of financial links
across economies, the default risk of any economy becomes a function not only of the
domestic fundamentals but also a function of the fundamentals of countries which
share investors with the domestic country. The model is used to show quantitatively
1See for example Valdes (1996), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Edwards (2000), Baig and Goldfajn
(2000), Dungey et al.(2002), Jaque (2004), and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2011).
2See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000), Hernandez and Valdes (2001), Kaminsky et al. (2004), Broner et al. (2006),
and Hau and Rey (2008).
3Some of the relevant papers considering a single country include Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
Arellano (2008), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2008), Mendoza
and Yue (2008), Martinez and Hatchondo (2009), and Lizarazo (2013).
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that contagion can explain co-movements in the price of emerging economy bonds,
capital flows, output and consumption beyond the level explained by a country’s own
fundamentals.
The theory of contagion in this paper is closely related to the theories of contagion
in the more recent papers by Park (2012), and Arellano and Bai (2013). The main
differences between the model in this paper and the models in Park (2012), and
Arellano and Bai (2013) are the channels of contagion under consideration. This
paper analyzes three channels of contagion: the wealth channel of contagion, the
portfolio recomposition channel of contagion, and the risk diversification channel of
contagion. Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) in the
preferences of the investor, these channels can explain contagion in models with two
or more countries, and in models for small or large open economies. In contrast, Park
(2012) focuses solely on the liquidity channel of contagion: a default by a country in
the investor’s portfolio triggers margin calls to the investor that force her to liquidate
investments in other countries, and contagion occurs. When more than two countries
are considered the liquidity channel of contagion gives the counterintuitive result
that the countries with more solid fundamentals are the ones experiencing contagion.
4 The two novel and main channels of contagion discussed in Arellano and Bai
(2013) are the channel of contagion through the effect of a domestic shock in the
international interest rate, and the channel of contagion through a strategic collusion
between defaulting countries in order to renegotiated debt obligations after a default.
These channels work only for the case of “large” open economies, which are able to
affect the international interest rate, and have bargaining power in negotiations with
the lenders after a default.
Within the present model, the framework is one of a set of small open economies
with stochastic endowments. These small open economies have access to an inter-
national credit market populated by international investors. International investors
are assumed to be risk averse, with preferences that exhibit decreasing absolute risk
4Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) explain the issues of the liquidity channel of contagion. The
reason for the counterintuitive result (countries with solid fundamentals are the ones that experience
contagion) is that the liquidation of the bonds of countries with stronger fundamentals entitles
smaller costs for the investor in terms of a negative impact on the price of the bond, and therefore
in terms of the investors wealth losses.
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aversion in wealth (DARA). There is a problem of enforcement in the sense that
international investors cannot force the small open economies to repay their debts.
If any economy defaults, it is temporarily excluded from the world credit market.
This context forces international investors to consider the risk of default when choos-
ing their portfolio. Any type of reallocation of the international investors portfolio
has effects over several countries at the same time. Therefore, the risk of default is
endogenously determined by the economy’s own fundamentals, and by the fundamen-
tals of other economies: income shocks to an emerging economy generate changes in
the risk of default in that economy, and, through financial links, these changes in
turn impact other emerging economies. Financial links generate contagion through
three channels, the Wealth channel, the Portfolio Recomposition channel, and the
Risk Diversification channel.
(i) The Wealth Channel of Contagion: When an income shock in a country
forces that country into default, the shock generates losses for international
investors. If the preferences of the investors exhibit DARA, the negative wealth
effect of the shock reduces investors’ tolerance for risk. A reduction in tolerance
for risk makes investors shift away from risky investments (countries) toward
riskless investments (T-Bills). Countries that initially neither default nor face
an income shock would face a reduction in the amount of resources available to
borrow from, leading to contagion.
(ii) The Portfolio Recomposition Channel of Contagion: When the risk of de-
fault is correlated across countries, an increase in the risk of default in one coun-
try modifies the optimal portfolio of international investors. As investors adjust
their portfolios, some countries which did not face an income shock nonetheless
face a reduction in the amount of resources available to borrow from, leading
to contagion. Other countries, receiving capital inflows, experience flight to
quality.
(iii) TheRisk Diversification Channel of Contagion: When an income shock in
a country forces that country into default, the country is temporarily excluded
from international credit markets. The exclusion reduces the opportunities for
risk diversification of the international investors, affecting their tolerance for
the riskiness of the other economies in their portfolio.
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The wealth channel of contagion is analyzed in Kyle and Xiong (2001), Lagunoff
and Schreft (2001), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). These papers show that if
investors’ preferences exhibit DARA, then as a consequence of the reduction on their
tolerance toward risk at lower levels of wealth, the optimal response of the investors
to financial losses is to reduce their risky investments. The portfolio recomposition
channel of contagion is studied in the theoretical papers of Choueri (1999), Schinasi
and Smith (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Broner et al. (2006), and Hau and
Rey(2008). Using a partial equilibrium approach where the determination of asset
returns is exogenous to the model, these papers highlight the fact that contagion
might be successfully explained by standard portfolio theory: in order to reestablish
the optimal degree of risk exposure in their portfolio after a negative shock to the
return of the assets of some economy, it is optimal for investors to liquidate holdings
of assets with expected returns that exhibit some correlation with the expected return
of the crisis country.
The results of the current paper are consistent with the empirical evidence regard-
ing contagion as a consequence of financial links. First, since investors’ preferences
exhibit DARA, they are able to tolerate more default risk when they are wealthier. As
a consequence, both capital flows to emerging economies and the equilibrium price of
sovereign bonds are increasing functions of investors’ wealth levels. Furthermore, the
high correlation between investors’ wealth and emerging economies’ financing condi-
tions can account for the simultaneity of crises because a default by any economy is
equivalent to a negative wealth shock to the investors. This shock is transmitted to
other countries via the wealth channel of contagion.
Second, because of the common investors, when the probability of default increases
for some foreign country, other countries’ financing conditions change. When the
probability of default for some foreign country increases, two opposing forces affect
the financing situation of other emerging economies: On the one hand, a decrease in
the price of the sovereign bonds of the foreign country constitutes an expected future
negative wealth shock to the investors due to the higher associated probability that
this country will default. This effect increases the default risk of the other economies.
On the other hand, an increase in default probabilities induces a substitution away
from the assets of the economies whose risk responds more strongly towards the
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assets of the economies whose risk did not increase too much. This effect would tend
to increase capital flows to some emerging economies. For any country different from
the crisis country, if the first effect dominates contagion is observed: the correlation of
capital flows across emerging economies is positive. On the other hand, if the second
effect dominates, “flight to quality” is observed: emerging economies with robust
fundamentals receive capital flows when other countries are affected by financial crises.
In practice, whenever the economies fundamentals are sufficiently weak, the effect of
the expected negative wealth shock will dominate the substitution effect.
Third, the likelihood of default in equilibrium for any emerging economy is a
function also of other emerging economies’ fundamentals. In the numerical simulation
in the present paper, for economies with relatively high default probabilities, default
is more likely to be an equilibrium outcome when the fundamentals of other economies
deteriorate and sovereign spreads are positively correlated.
The quantitative part of the paper studies the case of the contagion of the Argen-
tinean crisis to Uruguay and compares the results of this model with the results of a
model of endogenous sovereign risk without financial links across economies. These
results suggest that the model with financial links is able to endogenously explain the
positive correlation between spreads of relatively volatile emerging economies, and
the increase in the probability of default of an economy when another economy in the
common investors’ portfolio is at the verge of default. At the same time the model
delivers reasonable predictions for other real business cycle statistics of the economies
under study.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II develops the model; section III focuses
on characterizing contagion; section IV presents the numerical results of the paper;
and section V concludes.
2 The Model
In this model two kind of agents interact: emerging economies and international
investors. In what follows I begin by describing the problem of the economies, then
I described the problem of the investors, and finally I conclude by discussing the
equilibrium of the model and its implications for the contagion of sovereign risk crises.
I need first to describe the state space of the model.
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Definition 1 The state of the world in the model, S = (s,W ), is given by the re-
alization of the emerging economies’ fundamentals, s = s1 × s2 × . . . × sJ and the
representative investor’s asset position or wealth, W ∈ W ≡ [W,∞), W corresponds
to the natural debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994). In this model, sj = (bj, yj, dj),
bj ∈ B ≡ [b,∞) is economy j’s asset position where b is endogenously determined in
the model, yj ∈ Y is economy j’s endowment, and dj is a variable that describes if
economy j is in default or repayment state.
To simplify the notation of the model, in what follows S−j will refer to all the
state variables of the model except for the fundamentals of emerging economy j, that
is S−j = ({sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ). Also, to simplify the notation in what follows S
∗′ and S∗′−j
refer to next period state of the model with the variables taking their equilibrium
values.
2.1 Sovereign Countries
There are J < ∞ identical small open economies each populated by risk averse
households that maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption
max
{cj,t}
∞
t=0
Eτ
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cj,t) (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and cj, t is emerging economy j’s consumption
at time t. The periodic utility of emerging economy j takes the functional form
u(cj) =
c1−γj
1−γ
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the households of each economy j receive a stochastic stream
of consumption goods yj. This income is independently distributed across emerging
economies, and its realizations are assumed to have a compact support Y and to
follow a Markov process with a transition function f(y′j | yj). Households in each
economy j also receive a lump-sum transfer Tj from their government.
The government of each economy j is a benevolent government that aims to
maximize the lifetime utility of the households in the economy. The governments
have access to international financial markets, where they can trade one-period non-
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contingent bonds with international investors.5 The governments use their access to
financial markets to smooth the consumption path of the households in their economy.
In the international financial markets the governments borrow or save by buying
one period bonds b′j at price qj(b
′
j , S). Both the investors and each government k such
that k 6= j take as given the price of economy j’s non-contingent discount bonds.
In each period, the proceeds of these bonds are rebated back to the households in
economy j.
The bonds of any emerging economy j, b′j , are risky assets because debt con-
tracts between the government and the investors are not enforceable. At any time,
government j can choose to default on its debt. If the government defaults, all its
current debt is erased, and the government is temporarily excluded from international
financial markets. Defaulting also entails a direct output cost for country j.
Because international investors are risk averse, the bond prices of the emerging
economies, qj(b
′
j , S) for j = 1, . . . , J , have two components: the price of the expected
losses from default qRNj (δj(b
′
j , S)) that corresponds to the price of riskless bonds,
qf , (hereafter T-Bills) adjusted by the default probability δj(b
′
j , S), and an “excess”
premium or risk premium ζRAj (b
′
j , S).
For any emerging economy j, when b′j ≥ 0, the probability of default for the
economy, δj(b
′
j , S), is 0. Since the asset is riskless in this case, the risk premium,
ζRAj (b
′
j , S), is also 0. Therefore, the price of economy j’s bond is equal to the price of
T-Bills which is qf = 1
1+r
, where r is the constant international interest rate. Only
when b′j ≤ 0 can δj(b
′
j , S) and ζ
RA
j (b
′
j , S) be different from 0.
For any economy j, when its government chooses to repay its debts, the resource
constraint of the emerging economy is given by
cj = yj − qj(b
′
j , S)b
′
j + bj . (2)
For the same economy, when the government chooses to default the resource con-
5Throughout the paper it is assumed that the governments of the economies are not able to trade
financial assets between themselves.
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straint is given by
cj = y
def
j (3)
where ydefj = h(yj) and h(yj) is an increasing function.
Define V 0j (S) as the value function of the government of economy j that has the
option to default. The government starts the current period with assets bj and income
yj; the other economies that share investors with country j start the current period
with assets bk and income yk for k = 1, . . . , J and k 6= j; all these countries face
a representative international investor that has wealth W . The government of any
economy j decides whether to default or repay its debts to maximize the households’
welfare subject to market clearing conditions, optimization conditions and the law of
motion of S. Each government takes as given the repayment/default decisions of the
other governments and the investing decisions of the international investors.6
Given the option of default for country j, V 0j (S) satisfies
V 0j (S) = max
{R,D}
{
V Rj (S), V
D
j (S)
}
(4)
given S ′ = H(S)
where V Rj (S) is the value to government j of repaying its debt, V
D
j (S) is the value of
defaulting in the current period, and H is the law of motion of S which is determined
by the income shocks realizations of the emerging economies and the asset holding
decisions of the investors and the emerging economies in the investors’ portfolio.
If government j defaults, then the value of default is given by
V Dj (yj, S−j) = u(y
def
j ) +
β
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[θV 0j (0, y
′
j, S−j
′) + (1− θ)V Dj (0, y
′
j, S−j
′)]
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h.
where θ is the probability that a defaulting economy regains access to credit markets.
6Through the paper it is assumed that the governments of the economies make their repay-
ment/default decision at the same time.
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If government j repays its debts, then the value of not defaulting is given by
V Rj (S) = max
{b′j}
{
u(yj − qj(b
′
j , S)b
′
j + bj) + β
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
V 0j (S
′)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h
}
.
For the government of emerging country j, the repayment/default decision de-
pends on the comparison between the value of repaying its debt, V Rj (S), versus the
value of opting for financial autarky, V Dj (y
′
j, S−j
′). The repayment/default decision
is summarized by the indicator variable dj which takes on a value of 1 when the
government repays its debt and 0 when the government does not repay its debt.
For each economy j, conditional on S−j , emerging economy j’s default policy can
be characterized by its repayment and default sets:
Definition 2 For given S−j, the default set Dj (bj | S−j) consists of the equilibrium
set of yj for which default is optimal when the government’s asset holdings are bj:
Dj(bj | S−j) =
{
yj ∈ Y j : V
R
j (S) ≤ V
D
j (yj, S−j)
}
.
The repayment set Aj(bj | S−j) is the complement of the default set. It corresponds to
the equilibrium set of yj for which repayment is optimal when the government’s asset
holdings are bj:
Aj(bj | S−j) =
{
yj ∈ Y j : V
R
j (S) > V
D
j (yj, S−j)
}
.
Equilibrium default sets, Dj(b
′
j | S−j
′(S)), are related to equilibrium default prob-
abilities, δj(S
′ | S), by the equation
δj(b
′
j | S
′(S)) = 1−Edj
′(b′ | S ′(S)) =
∫
Dj(b
′
j |S−j
′(S))
f(y′j | yj)dy
′
j ×
J∏
k=1,k 6=j
∫
y′
k
f(y′k | yk)dy
′
k. (5)
In this model, conditional on S−j , the well known results of comparative stat-
ics for the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral international in-
vestors also apply (see for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008)):
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First, default sets are shrinking in the economies’ assets (i.e. if bj,1 < bj,2 then
Dj (bj,2 | S−j) ⊆ Dj (bj,1 | S−j) ), and therefore the probability of default δj(b
′
j , S)
is decreasing in b′j . Second, the governments of the emerging economies only default
when the economies are facing capital outflows, i.e. when bj− qj
(
b′j(S), S
)
b′j (S) < 0.
Third, conditional on the persistence of the income process not being too high, the
default risk of any economy j is larger for lower levels of income. Since the economic
intuition of these results is identical to the intuition in the model of endogenous
sovereign default risk with risk neutral investors, it will not be discussed in detail
here.
On the other hand, as in models of endogenous sovereign risk and risk averse
investors (see for example Lizarazo (2013)), the risk premium ζRAj (b
′
j , S) is also de-
creasing in b′j . Therefore bond prices qj(b
′
j , S) are increasing in b
′
j .
2.2 International Investors
There are a large but finite number of identical competitive investors who will be
represented by a representative investor. The representative investor is a risk averse
agent whose preferences exhibit DARA. The investor has perfect information regard-
ing the income processes of the emerging economies, and in each period the investor
is able to observe the realizations of these incomes.
The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility
from consumption
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLv
(
cLt
)
(6)
where cL is the investor’s consumption and v(cL), her periodic utility, is given by
v(cL) =
(cL)
1−γL
1−γL
, with γL > 0. The representative investor is endowed with some
initial wealth, W0, at time 0; in each period she receives an exogenous income X .
Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can
borrow or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here)
by buying T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of qf . The represen-
tative investor can also invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economies
j = 1, . . . , J which have an endogenously determined stochastic price of qj. As was
10
mentioned in the sub-section on the emerging economies, this price is taken as given
by both the investor and the governments of the emerging economies.
On investor’s side, the timing of the decisions within each period is as follows:
After the shocks to the economies’ income are realized and the governments of
these economies make their repayment/default decisions, the investor realizes her
gains/losses and observes her actual wealth for the period, W . W is given by
W = ϑTB +
∑J
j=1 ϑjdj. After observing W , the investor chooses her next period
portfolio allocation, investing in the economies whose governments have paid the
debt from the previous period, ϑ′j , and in T-Bills, ϑ
TB′ . Finally, the representative
international investor’s consumption, cL, takes place.
In each period the representative investor faces the budget constraint
cL = X +W − qfϑTB′ −
J∑
j=1
qjϑ
′
jdj. (7)
To simplify the investor’s optimization problem, it is assumed that the investor
cannot go short in her investments with emerging economies. Therefore, whenever the
governments of the emerging economies are saving, the representative international
investor receives these savings and invests them completely in ϑTB
′
. Therefore, for
any economy j, ϑ′j = −b
′
j if the economy is borrowing, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
The law of motion of the representative investor’s wealth is given by
W ′ =
J∑
j=1
ϑ′jd
′
j + ϑ
TB′. (8)
Further, the representative investor faces a lower bound on her asset holdings
W < 0 that prevents Ponzi schemes, W ′ ≥ W . W corresponds to the “natural”
debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994). Additionally, the investor’s asset position in
bonds of the emerging economy is non-negative, i.e. ϑj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , J .
For the representative investor that faces J governments, each with the possibility
of defaulting and each with assets bj and income yj at the start of the period, define
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the value function, V 0L (S), as follows:
V 0L (S) = max
{ϑ′j}
J
j=1
, ϑTB′
{
v(X +W − qfϑTB′ −
J∑
j=1
qjϑ
′
jdj) + βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
V 0L (S
′)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h
}
.
subject to
W ′ =
J∑
j=1
ϑ′jd
′
j + ϑ
TB′,
W < W,
S ′ = H(S).
Because v(cL) satisfies the standard Inada conditions, and X is sufficiently large,
cL > 0 always. Because the representative investor is not credit constrained, when
the government does not default in the current period the solution to the investor’s
optimization problem can be characterized by the following first order conditions:
For ϑTB′ : qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)] J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h. (9a)
For ϑ′j : qjvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
dj
′
] J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h. (9b)
The set of J equations (9) determine the allocation of the representative investor’s re-
sources to each one of the J emerging countries. It is possible to manipulate equations
(9) to get
qj = βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
vcL (cL)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h.
= βL
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
, dj
′
]
vcL (cL)
+ qRNj .
= ζRAj + q
RN
j . (10)
where qRNj = q
f (1− δj). Equation (10) shows the two components of the bond prices
of economies that trade financially with risk averse investors. The first component,
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qRNj , compensates investors for the expected loss from default. The second compo-
nent, ζRAj , corresponds to the risk premium that economy j’s bonds must carry in
order to induce risk averse investors to hold them. The main determinant of the
“excess” risk premium ζRAj is the covariance term in equation (10). This covariance
term is non-positive: Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
, dj
′
]
≤ 0. 7
Because cL is a function of W , γL, and the investor’s investments in other
economies, it is possible to see from equation (10), that qj for j = 1, · · · , J are
also a function of those variables. Therefore, in this model, conditional on S−j, the
comparative statics results of Lizarazo (2013) follow:
(i) For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international investor in-
creases, the governments’ incentives to default increase: As discussed in Lizarazo
(2013), γL is an important determinant of the emerging economies’ access to
credit markets and their risk of default. The more risk averse are international
investors, the higher is the default risk and the tighter are the endogenous credit
constraints faced by all emerging economies. This characteristic of the model is
consistent with empirical findings which characterize the role of investor’s risk
aversion in the determination of country risk and sovereign yield.8
(ii) Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative investor. For
all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj given W2, then
default will be optimal for bj for the same states yj given W1 and there-
fore Dj
(
bj | W2, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
⊆ Dj
(
bj | W1, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
: Also as in Lizarazo
(2013), for the present model, other things given the higher is W , the smaller is
7For b′j with δj = 0 or δj = 1, Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, dj
′
]
= 0, and qj = q
f or qj = 0 respectively. If
0 < δj < 1, then for the states of the word next period in which government j repays
[
W ′ |dj ′=1
]
=
ϑj
′ +
∑J
k=1,k 6=j ϑk
′dk
′ + ϑTB′; and for the states in which the government j defaults
[
W ′ |dj ′=0
]
=∑J
k=1,k 6=j ϑk
′dk
′ + ϑTB′. Because
[
W ′ |dj ′=1
]
>
[
W ′ |dj ′=0
]
then
[
cL
′
|dj ′=1
]
>
[
cL
′
|dj ′=0
]
and
by concavity of v(·),
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|dj ′=1
]
<
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|dj ′=0
]
. As a consequence, for bj
′ with more
dj
′ = 1, vcL
(
cL
′
)
is lower. Clearly for this case Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, dj
′
]
< 0.
8See, for example, Arora and Cerisola (2001), FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Ferruci et al.
(2004), Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2005), Gonzales and Levy (2006), and Longstaff et al. (2008).
These papers find that changes in the risk appetite of international investors have an important
impact on the determination of sovereign bond spreads of emerging economies.
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the default risk of any economy in the investor’s portfolio, and hence the more
relaxed is the economy’s endogenous credit constraint. Several empirical papers
are consistent with this characteristic of the model.9 This characteristic of the
model is also consistent with the evidence regarding financial contagion across
countries who share investors.10
In comparison with the previous literature on endogenous sovereign default and
risk averse international investors, in the current model there is a novel issue: hav-
ing investments in several emerging economies allows the investors to diversify the
sovereign risk of any specific economy. In the next subsection, this new issue is briefly
discussed.
2.2.1 Risk Diversification
In the current multi-country model, risk diversification is a novel dimension in which
the risk aversion on the side of the investors has an important impact on the access
to credit for the emerging economies. Risk diversification facilitates the investor’s
consumption smoothing; therefore it increases the expected marginal benefit of con-
sumption of risky investments (sovereign bonds in the context of this model), and
reduces the need for self-insurance (T-Bills in this model).
Risk diversification increases in the model when the investors have access to in-
vestments in more emerging economies.11 That is, if N is the number of emerging
economies in the investor’s portfolio and N is relatively small, if the investor can
invest in N = N2 countries instead of N = N1 countries with N2 > N1, then the
investor’s portfolio is more diversified, and the expected marginal benefit in terms
of consumption of a risky portfolio is larger. As a consequence, better access to
9See, for example, FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Mody and Taylor (2003), Ferruci et al. (2004),
Gonzales and Levy (2006), and Longstaff et al. (2008). These papers establish that proxies of
international investors’ wealth are important factors in the determination of sovereign bond spreads
for emerging economies.
10See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000), Hernandez and Valdes (2001), Kaminsky et al. (2004), Broner et al. (2006),
and Hau and Rey (2008).
11Access to more opportunities for investment helps to diversify the risk of the portfolio only if
no two assets are perfectly correlated with each other. This is the case in the current model since
the endowment processes of all the economies are independently distributed.
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risk diversification allows the investor to better tolerate risk: more opportunities for
risk diversification imply more willingness to take sovereign risk by international in-
vestors.12 Therefore the amount of W that is invested in risky bonds is larger when
the representative investor has access to a larger number of risky sovereign bonds.
However, when N is relatively large, the effect of having access to investment
opportunities in new sovereign bonds is very small or nil. From the investor’s point
view, having N possible investment opportunities generates 2N possible states in the
following period, each with a relatively small individual likelihood of occurrence. This
small probability of the individual states facilitates consumption smoothing.
How small N needs to be for the gains from risk diversification to be significant
depends mainly on two factors:
(i) The investors’ borrowing limit W : This borrowing limit, which depends on
X and r, determines the maximum total amount of resources that the investor
can invest. The larger this borrowing limit is, the smaller is the investors’
opportunity cost of investing in any new risky asset.
(ii) The riskiness of individual sovereign bonds: If the individual investments avail-
able to the investors are more risky, there is a higher value of having access to
additional sovereign bonds; these additional sovereign bonds make diversifica-
12By comparing the RHS of equation (9a) for the case in which the investors can invest only in
one emerging economy (i.e., N = 1) to the case in which the investors can invest in two different
emerging economies (i.e., N = 2), we can see the effect of better opportunities for risk diversification
on the need of the investor for self insurance (i.e., investing in safe assets as T-Bills). From the point
of view of the investors, when N = 1 there are only two states of the world in the next period: a state
with high consumption that occurs when economy 1 pays back and that has a probability (1− δ1),
and a state of low consumption that occurs when economy 1 defaults and that has a probability δ1.
In contrast, when N = 2 there are four possible states: a state of high consumption that occurs when
the emerging economies pay back and that has a probability (1 − δ1)(1 − δ2), a state of moderate
consumption that occurs when emerging economy 1 pays back and emerging economy 2 defaults and
that has a probability (1−δ1)δ2, another state of moderate consumption that occurs when emerging
economy 1 defaults and emerging economy 2 pays and that has a probability δ1(1− δ2), and a state
of low consumption that has a probability δ1δ2. If in both scenarios the investors were to invest the
same total amount of resources in sovereign bonds, it is clear that when N = 2 the extreme states of
the world - very high or very low consumption - are not as likely as when N = 1. Therefore, given
the concavity of v(cL), the marginal expected benefit of the investment in T-Bills would be smaller
(i.e., E
[
vcL(c
L′ | N = 2)
]
< E
[
vcL(c
L′ | N = 1)
]
).
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tion more feasible.
The discussion of international investors illustrates three factors which have an
effect on the determination of qj : investors’ wealth, the fundamentals of other emerg-
ing economies in the investors’ portfolio, and the number of those economies in the
investors’ portfolio. Therefore it should be clear that sovereign bond prices across
economies that share investors are jointly determined and must be correlated. The
discussion of this correlation will be postponed until the section on the characteriza-
tion of contagion channels.
2.3 Equilibrium
Let BB and BW be the Borel sigma algebras of B and W, and P(Y ) the power set
of Y . Let ΣS be the sigma algebra on S,M = (S,ΣS) the corresponding measurable
space, and M the set of all probability measures on M . Let H : M → M be the
aggregate law of motion, therefore S ′ = H(S).
Definition 3 The recursive equilibrium for the model is defined as a set of policy
functions for (i) the emerging economies’ consumption {cj(S)}
J
j=1, (ii) the govern-
ments’ asset holdings
{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (iii) the governments’ default decisions {dj(S)}
J
j=1
and the associated default sets Dj(bj | S−j), (iv) the representative investor’s con-
sumption cL(S), (v) the representative investor’s holdings of emerging economies’
bonds
{
θ′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (vi) the representative investor’s holdings of T-Bills θTB
′
(S), and
(vii) the emerging economies’ bond price functions
{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, such that:
(i) Taking as given the representative investor’s policies and the bond price func-
tions
{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, the emerging economies’ consumption {cj(S)}
J
j=1 satis-
fies the economies’ resource constraints. Additionally, the policy functions{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, {dj(S)}
J
j=1 and default sets Dj(bj | S−j) satisfy the optimization
problem of the governments of the emerging economies.
(ii) Taking as given the governments’ policies and the bond price functions{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, the representative investor’s consumption cL(s) satisfies her bud-
get constraint. Also, the representative investor’s policy functions
{
ϑ′j(S)
}J
j=1
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and ϑTB
′
(S) satisfy her optimization problem and the law of motion of her
wealth.
(iii) Bond prices reflect the governments’ probabilities of default and the risk premi-
ums demanded by the representative international investor. These prices clear
the market for all the emerging economies’ bonds:
bj
′(S) = −ϑj
′(S) if bj
′(S) < 0 (11a)
0 = −ϑj
′(S) if bj
′(s) ≥ 0. (11b)
(iv) The aggregate law of motion H is generated by an exogenous multivariate inde-
pendently distributed Markov process with a transition function
{
f(y′j | yj)
}J
j=1
,
and the policy functions
({
b′j
}J
j=1
,W ′
)
.
(a) Define the transition function Q
S,{yj}
J
j=1,{y′j}
J
j=1
: S × ΣS → [0, 1] by
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Q
S,{yj}
J
j=1,{y′j}
J
j=1
(S,ΣS) =
{ ∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
∏J
j=1 f(yj, y
′
j)dy
′
j for S ∈ ΣS
0 otherwise
for all ({yj}
J
j=1 ,
{
b′j
}J
j=1
,W ) ∈ S and all (Y J , BJ ,W) ∈ ΣS.
(b) Hence
S ′ = H(S) =
∫
Q
S,{yj}
J
j=1,{y′j}
J
j=1
(S,ΣS)S
(
J∏
j=1
(dbj × dyj)× dW
)
3 Contagion
From equation (10) it is evident that in this model the bond prices of economy j
depend on the income realizations of other emerging economies and the associated
13In this context Q
S,{yj}
J
j=1
,{y′j}
J
j=1
(S,ΣS) is the probability that economies j = 1, . . . , J with
current assets {bj}
J
j=1 and income {yj}
J
j=1 end up with assets
{
b′j
}J
j=1
and income
{
y′j
}J
j=1
tomorrow,
and that investors with current wealth W end up with wealth W ′ tomorrow.
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repayment/default decisions of those countries. Hence, considering a crisis in some
foreign emerging economy k as a shock that changes the expected repayment/default
decisions of the government of country k, and therefore δk and qk, a crisis in the
emerging economy k has three effects over the optimal investor’s portfolio allocation
to other emerging economies:
• A wealth effect: Wealth Channel of Contagion
• A substitution effect: The Recomposition Channel of Contagion
• A diversification effect: The Risk Diversification Channel of Contagion
In what follows, mainly for expositional purposes, these three effects are charac-
terized as if they operated separately. In reality, they interact and sometimes reinforce
or modify each other. More specifically, for the discussion of the wealth channel of
contagion and the recomposition channel of contagion it will be initially assumed that
a default by economy k does not imply a reduction in the diversification opportunities
of the investor: This would be the case if once a country defaults it is replaced in the
investors portfolio by an identical country with a clean default record. This assump-
tion of replacement of the defaulting economy after a default will be eliminated in
order to study the Risk Diversification channel of contagion.
3.1 Wealth Channel of Contagion
First, the crisis in country k has a negative current or expected wealth effect. Because
the investor’s preferences exhibit DARA, she would move away from risky emerging
economies’ assets towards safer assets; this effect corresponds to the Wealth Channel
of Contagion.
Proposition 1 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Because in this model default
sets are shrinking in W then if economy k in the investor’s portfolio defaults, then
for economy j, which is also in the investor’s portfolio, incentives to default increase.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward: a default by some emerging
economy in the investors’ portfolio is equivalent to a negative wealth shock. Therefore,
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because default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative investor—i.e.,
the probability of default of any emerging economy is lower when the representative
investor is wealthier—the probability of default for other economies in the investors’
portfolio increases as a consequence of the default by economy k.
3.2 The Recomposition Channel of Contagion
Second, the crisis in country k generates substitution between different risky emerg-
ing economy assets in the investor’s portfolio. The substitution effect of the crisis
corresponds to the Portfolio Recomposition Channel of Contagion.
This channel operates because the increase in δk in this period has two effects on
the portfolio allocation of the representative investor:
(i) The increase in δk reduces the expected wealth of the investor in the following
period thereby reducing the investor’s tolerance for risk. This reduction in risk
tolerance induces a reduction of the bonds holdings of all risky countries. This
effect would imply a contagion of the crisis in country k to country j.14
(ii) The increase in δk increases the marginal expected benefit of all other risky
14This effect can be seen by inspection of equation (9a). Other things given, an increase in δk
increases the RHS of equation (9a). For example, in a two-country model, the RHS of equation (9a)
is given by:
E
[
vcL(c
L′)
]
=
(1− δj)(1− δk)
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 1)
]
+ (1 − δj)δk
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 0)
]
+ δj(1 − δk)
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 0, d
′
k = 1)
]
+ δjδk
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 0, d
′
k = 0)
]
.
All other things equal, an increase in δk has the following effect in the RHS of equation (9a):
∂E
[
vcL(c
L′)
]
∂δk
= (1 − δj)
{[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 0)
]
−
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 1)
]}
+ δj
{[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 0, d
′
k = 0)
]
−
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 0, d
′
k = 1)
]}
.
The concavity of the investor’s utility function ensures that the two terms in the braces are positive
and therefore
∂E
[
v
cL
(cL
′
)
]
∂δk
> 0. This result implies that the representative investor will optimally
choose to have larger holdings of T-Bills. Larger holdings of T-Bills amount to more self-insurance
or lower exposure to risk by the investor.
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investments. This change induces an increase of the investor’s bonds holdings
of all risky countries. This effect would imply flight to quality towards country
j as a consequence of the crisis in country k.15
Since there are two opposing effects at work, it is not possible to unambigu-
ously characterize the operation of the portfolio recomposition channel theoretically.
However it is clear that the second effect would be stronger for countries for which
∂E
[
v
cL
(cL
′
)d′j
]
∂δk
is relatively large. This would be the case whenever the weights given
to the states of the world in which country j pays its debts increase more after an
increase in δk. Using the case of a two-country model for illustrative purposes, it is
possible to show that for that case
∂2E
[
v
cL
(cL
′
)d′j
]
∂δk∂δj
< 0.16 Therefore for the case of a
two country model the substitution effect of an increase in δk is larger for countries
with a small probability of default δj .
The intuition derived from the two-country model seems to suggest that whenever
δk increases, countries with weak fundamentals, which are reflected in high default
probabilities, experience contagion; countries with solid fundamentals, which are re-
15This effect can be seen by inspection of equation (9b) for economy j. Other things equal, an
increase in δk increases the RHS of equation (9b) for economy j. For example in a two-country
model the RHS of equation (9b) is given by:
E
[
vcL(c
L′)d ′j
]
=
(1− δj)(1− δk)
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 1)
]
+ (1− δj)δk
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 0)
]
.
All other things equal, an increase in δk has the following effect in the RHS of equation (9b):
∂E
[
vcL(c
L′)d′j
]
∂δk
= (1− δj)
{[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 0)
]
−
[
vcL(c
L′ | d′j = 1, d
′
k = 1)
]}
.
The concavity of the investor’s utility function ensures that the term in the braces is positive and
therefore
∂E
[
v
cL
(cL
′
)d ′j
]
∂δk
> 0. Therefore the representative investor will optimally choose to have
larger holdings of country j sovereign bonds when δk increases. Clearly this result implies a substi-
tution of country k bonds for bonds of the other risky economies.
16For the case of two countries
∂2E
[
vcL(c
L′)d′j
]
∂δk∂δj
= −(1− δj)
∂E
[
vcL(c
L′)d′j
]
∂δk
< 0.
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flected in low default probabilities, experience flight to quality.17
The intuition behind the portfolio recomposition channel can be framed in the
context of the previous literature: In a partial equilibrium model of contagion, Kodres
and Pritsker (1998) identified the extent of the impact of the shock in one asset over
another asset. They find that the impact depends on the degree of correlation between
the returns of those two assets. In the context of the current model, this result implies
that the impact of a shock in economy k over a particular economy j depends on the
strength of the positive correlation between qk and qj .
Quantitatively, the current model exhibits the following property: If the positive
correlation between qk and qj is low (i.e., probabilities of default are quite differ-
ent), then the positive substitution effect of the crisis in country k might dominate
its negative wealth effect. In this case there is flight to quality. This outcome is
observed when the other economies in the investor’s portfolio have relatively sound
fundamentals. On the other hand, when the positive correlation between qk and
qj is large (probabilities of default are similar), the negative expected wealth effect
dominates. In this case contagion is observed due to portfolio recomposition. This
outcome is observed if the other economies in the investor’s portfolio have relatively
weak fundamentals.
3.3 The Risk Diversification Channel of Contagion
Third, given the exclusion from credit markets of any defaulting economy and the
no-replacement in the investor’s portfolio of that economy by an identical country
with a clear default record, default by country k reduces the investor’s opportunities
for risk diversification; therefore default by country k increases the investor’s need
for self-insurance. On the other hand, default by country k also increases the relative
importance of any other risky bond as an available mean to the investor for risk
diversification.
17Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) identify flight to quality in the following cases: during
the first two quarters after the Mexican crisis when mutual fund flows to Malaysia, Colombia, Poland,
and the Czech Republic increased by more than 10%; during the first two quarters after the Thai
crisis, when mutual fund flows to Venezuela, the Slovak Republic, and Sri Lanka increased by more
than 5%; and during the first two quarters after the Russian crisis, when mutual fund flows to
Mexico and Singapore increased by more than 5%.
21
In order to understand comparative static effects of risk diversification on the
investor’s asset holdings of emerging economies bonds ϑj and the interaction of risk
diversification with the other contagion channels, we focus on the equations (9) taking
qj and default probabilities δj as given, and assuming that ex-ante all economies are
identical.
Figure 1 shows the effect of the risk diversification channel on the increase in the
investor’s asset holdings of economy j’s bonds when economy k defaults. This increase
is plotted as a function of the number of countries N in the investor’s portfolio and
for five different levels of δj .
18 As can be seen in Figure 1, if risk diversification were
the only channel of contagion in the model—i.e., if the only cost for the investors of
economy k’s default is the reduction in the number of countries in their portfolio—
then, in response to the default by emerging economy k, flight to quality would be
observed.
Since the cost of a default for the investors goes beyond the reduction in their
opportunities for risk diversification, the following sub-section looks at the interaction
of the wealth channel of contagion and the risk diversification channel of contagion.
3.4 Interaction Between The Wealth and The Risk Diversification Chan-
nels of Contagion
When economy k defaults, two opposing forces come into play: the wealth channel
of contagion and the risk diversification channel of contagion. Which of these forces
dominates would determine the net effect that a default by an economy k has over
any other economy j in the investor’s portfolio.
In this subsection, taking qj and δj as given and assuming that ex-ante all
economies are identical, static comparative analysis of equations (9) shows that the
wealth channel of contagion dominates whenever N is small, or whenever the de-
faulting economy’s debt with the investors is high.19 Additionally, the stronger is
18The increase in the investor’s asset holdings of sovereign bonds is measured as a proportion of
the mean income level of the emerging economies.
19If N is small the investors do not have many opportunities for risk diversification and as a
consequence their exposure to the individual economies is high. If the debt of economy k (θk = −bk)
is large, then the shock to the investor’s wealth resulting from country k’s default is large.
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Figure 1: The Risk Diversification Channel of Contagion.
the crisis—i.e. the larger the number of countries that are initially defaulting—the
more likely it is that negative contagion towards economy j would be observed after
a default by economy k. Finally, the riskier is the average emerging economy in the
investor’s portfolio (measuring the risk of the economies by their probability of de-
fault), the more likely it is to observe negative contagion to economy j after a default
by economy k.
The magnitude of the shock to the wealth of the investors of a default by country
k is given by −bk. From previous models of endogenous sovereign risk, it is known
that in order for an economy to find it optimal to default it must be the case that
bk − qk(b
′
k, S)b
′
k < 0, i.e., the economy is experiencing capital outflows at the moment
of default. Therefore, when default occurs, the smallest possible wealth shock to the
investors would be given by −qk(b
′
k, S)b
′
k with qk(b
′
k, S) being the price that would be
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observed for bonds of economy k if the economy repays its debts in this period.20
Figure 2 shows the effect of the interaction of the wealth and the risk diversification
channels of contagion. Figure 2 shows the increase in the investor’s asset holdings of
emerging economy j’s bonds when country k defaults, as a function of N , for a given
δj , and three different levels of debt of country k.
From Figure 2 it can be seen that after a default by one economy in the investors’
portfolio the net effect on the other economies in the investors’ portfolio would depend
on N : for small N (N ≤ 4) the wealth effect dominates the effect of the change in
the opportunities for risk diversification. In this case, after a default by economy k,
negative contagion to the other economies in the investors’ portfolio is observed. For
intermediate values of N (N = 5) the net effect would be negative contagion only
20Because bk − qk(b
′
k, S)b
′
k < 0 then bk < qk(b
′
k, S)b
′
k and therefore ϑk > −qk(b
′
k, S)b
′
k.
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if the wealth shock is large enough, i.e. if the debt level of the defaulting economy
is sufficiently large. Finally for larger N (N ≥ 6), after a default by country k, the
effect of the change in the opportunities for risk diversification cancels out the wealth
effect. In this case flight to quality is observed.
The intuition is as follows for the relationship between the net effect of a default
by economy k and the size of N : When N is large the investors do not need to hold
T-Bills to self-insure; they hold all their wealth in risky bonds. In this case investors
have the maximum possible total exposure to risky sovereign bonds but their exposure
to individual countries is small. As a consequence of the small exposure to country k,
the default by this country has a small wealth shock; and since after the default the
number of opportunities for risk diversification, N − 1, is still large, there is no need
for the investors to increase their holdings of T-Bills in order to self- insure. In this
case investors substitute away from country k’s bonds into the other risky bonds. On
the other hand, when N is small, investors need to hold T-Bills to self insure against
the countries’ sovereign risk. Additionally the exposure to each individual country
in the portfolio is relatively large. Therefore, when country k defaults, the resulting
wealth shock is large. Investors substitute away from country k’s bonds into T-Bills.
Figure 2 also shows the interaction of the wealth channel of contagion and the
risk diversification channel of contagion for the three different levels of debt for the
defaulting countries after a massive default involving N − 1 countries (i.e., only one
country in the investors’ portfolio does not default initially).
From the comparison between the effect of one country’s default versus a massive
default by N − 1 countries, it is possible to conclude that the magnitude of the crisis
matters to determine if negative contagion or flight to quality is observed after a
sovereign crisis: When there is a wide-spread crisis involving several countries, there
is a higher likelihood of observing negative contagion instead of flight to quality.
Figure 3 shows the change in the investor’s asset holdings of sovereign bonds of
economy j when economy k defaults as a function of N , for a given bk and different
values of δj . Figure 3 illustrates that other things given, for a riskier set of individual
sovereign bonds—measured by the countries’ default probabilities— the risk diver-
sification channel of contagion would dominate the wealth channel of contagion at
smaller values of N .
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Figure 3: Wealth and Risk Diversification Channels of Contagion: Portfolio Average
Risk.
In terms of the net effect of a default by country k on the other countries in the
investor’s portfolio, the findings presented here are in line with recommended safe
investment practices: investors are better off when they have small exposure to in-
dividual investments, and as much as possible risk diversification of their portfolio.
According to the current model, these recommended investment practices make neg-
ative contagion less likely to occur, but at the cost of limiting credit flows to the
individual economies not only during bad times but also during good times.
3.5 Summary of the Main Findings about Contagion Channels
To summarize the channels of contagion in the current model, the main findings are
as follows:
• The larger is the level of debt of a country, the stronger are the potential effects
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of a default by this country over the other economies in the investor’s portfolio.
• The weaker are the fundamentals of a country, the more likely it is after a
default by another country that the weak country faces contagion.
• The more diversified is the investor’s portfolio, the less likely it is that negative
contagion occurs after an economy defaults.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The simulation of the model in this paper looks at the Argentinean default of 2001
and its contagion to Uruguay. This case was chosen over the Tequila Crisis or the
Russian Default for several reasons:
• The current model focuses on the case of countries that share investors. This
assumption disqualifies to a large extent analysis of the contagion of the Russian
Default.21
• In the case of the Tequila crisis, there was no actual default, making it hard to
see such a case as a straightforward application of the model in this paper.
• The assumption in the model of identical countries except for the actual re-
alizations of their endowments seems to better suit the case of Argentina and
Uruguay than the cases of the Tequila Crisis or the Russian Default.22
21Despite the large impact of the Russian Default on Latin American countries, these countries
do not seem to share investors with Russia: International investors seem to specialize in specific
geographical areas, i.e. some of them focus on Latin America, others in Asia, and some others in
the so called economies in transition.
22While the estimated process for Argentina and Uruguay are relatively similar, the estimated
process for Russia and Brazil are quite different and the same is true for the process of Mexico,
Brazil, and Argentina:
Country Time Period Autocorrelation Std. Dev.
Argentina 1983Q1-2002Q1 0.9505 0.031
Uruguay 1988Q1-2002Q1 0.9291 0.026
Brazil 1995Q1-2002Q1 0.5910 0.031
Mexico 1995Q1-2002Q1 0.8471 0.022
Russia 1983Q1-2002Q1 0.8252 0.035
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• Finally, there is a large literature on endogenous sovereign default that looks
at the case of the Argentinean default allowing for an easier comparison of the
results in this paper with the results of previous models of endogenous sovereign
default.
A possible argument against the choice of the Argentinean crisis would be that
Argentina and Uruguay share many other links, such as trade, geographical region,
similar cultural background, etc., and these links could have a role in explaining
the transmission of the crisis. However, as noted in the introduction, the previous
empirical literature in contagion has identified financial links as the main channel of
transmission of crises.
The aim of this section then is to show quantitatively that even in the absence of
additional links across countries, financial links can explain and replicate the follow-
ing two observed dynamics of sovereign yield spreads and capital flows to emerging
economies:
(i) Capital flows and domestic interest rates across emerging economies are posi-
tively correlated.
(ii) Default is more likely to be observed when the fundamentals of other emerging
economies deteriorate.
4.1 Contagion of the Argentinean Default of 2001
During 2001 Argentina faced one of the worst economic crises of its history. The crisis
forced the country to default on US$100 billion external government debt (which cor-
responded to nearly 37% of GDP) by the end of 2001, and had strong real effects that
extended into 2002: according to estimates from the IMF, during 2001 Argentina’s
GDP fell by 4.4% and during 2002 it fell by an additional 10.9%.
For its part, Uruguay had been facing economic problems since 1998. These prob-
lems were aggravated in 2001 by the outburst of cow foot-and-mouth disease which
negatively affected Uruguayan exports. Finally, the Argentinean crisis prompted
caution in consumers and investors leading to a fall in the real demand for and a
simultaneous exchange rate depreciation of the Uruguayan peso. As a result, there
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Table 1: Contagion: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.025
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.945
Emerging Economy’s Discount Factor β 0.953
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2
Probability of re-entry τ 0.282
Critical level of output for asymmetrical output cost yˆ = 0.969E(y)
Representative investor’s Income X 0.01
Representative Investor’s Discount Factor βL 0.98
Representative investor’s Risk Aversion γL 2
Risk Free Interest Rate rf = 1
qf
0.017
was a significant increase in the public debt to GDP ratio in Uruguay, reaching a level
of 52%. According to the estimates of the IMF, during 2001 Uruguay’s GDP fell by
3.5%, and during 2002 Uruguay’s GDP fell by an additional 7.1%.
The fall in GDP in 2002 was due mainly to problems in Uruguay’s financial sector
which had strong financial links to Argentina. In early 2002, following the Argentina’s
default, Uruguay’s financial sector experienced large dollar deposit outflows (these
outflows exceeded US$100 million per day in the month of July 2002), as it faced a
rapid decline in its international reserves. Uruguay’s international reserves fell from
3 billion dollars at the end of 2001 to 650 million by August 2002. During 2002,
Uruguay’s debt was downgraded by investment rating agencies signaling the credit
risk involved in Uruguay’s external debt.
4.1.1 Simulation
Given the assumption of the model of identical economies that only differ in the real-
izations of their endowments, and in order to facilitate comparison with the previous
literature on the subject, the parameters considered for the simulation are chosen to
replicate the features of the Argentinean economy, and are taken from the calibra-
tion for this economy in Arellano (2008). The parameters related to international
investors are taken from Lizarazo (2013) which presents a quantitative model with
endogenous sovereign risk and risk averse international investors whose preferences
exhibit DARA for the case of the Argentinean default.
Table 1 shows the parameters of the numerical analysis of the model. The coeffi-
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cient of risk aversion of the economy is 2, a standard value considered in the business
cycle literature. The free interest rate is set to 1.7%, to match the quarterly US
interest rate of a bond with a maturity of 5 years during the period under study.
GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + ε
y with
E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values estimated for the Argentinean economy are
ρ = 0.945 and σy = 0.025. Following a default there is an asymmetrical function for
the output loss as follows:
φ(y) =
{
ŷ if y > ŷ
y if y ≤ ŷ
}
(12)
with ŷ = 0.969E(y) which in Arellano (2008) targets a value of 5.53% for the aver-
age debt service to GDP ratio. The probability of re-entry to credit markets after
defaulting is set at 0.282, which is consistent with the empirical evidence regarding
the exclusion from credit markets of defaulting countries (see Gelos et al. (2011));
in Arellano (2008) this value targets a volatility of 1.75 for the trade balance. The
discount factor is set at 0.953 which in Arellano (2008) targets an annual default
probability of 3%.
The parameters for the international investors are as follows: the representative
investor’s discount factor is set to 0.98. As in Lizarazo (2013), if there were no
uncertainty, the discount factor of the investors would pin-down the international
risk free interest rate (i.e., β
L
qf
= 1); however, with uncertainty, in order to have a
well defined distribution for the investor’s assets, it is necessary that the discount
factor satisfies β
L
qf
< 1. The value of βL = 0.98 is the highest value in the range
commonly used in business cycle studies of industrialized countries such that for an
international interest rate of 1.7% the asset distribution of the investors is well defined.
The representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion is set at 2; this value is chosen
to generate a mean spread for model that is as close as possible to the mean spread in
Argentina for the period of study, which corresponds to 12.67%.23 The representative
23Lizarazo (2013) also considers a value of 5 for γL which helps to attain a better match for the
level of the spreads and their volatility, however this larger value for γL has important costs in terms
of the computational time that it takes to solve the model. Therefore, given the larger dimension of
the contagion model relative to model in Lizarazo (2013), the value of 2 is chosen for γL.
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investor receives a deterministic income of X = 1% of the emerging economy’s mean
income in each period. As in Lizarazo (2013), this parameter is included to preclude
the investors from not investing in the emerging economy in order to avoid a negative
consumption level in the case of default. Therefore, the strategy for choosing X is to
give it as little importance as possible by choosing a value that is close to 0 but that
still allows for interior solutions regarding the investor’s investments in the emerging
economy’s bonds.24
The model is simulated for two economies that are labeled as (A) and (U) respec-
tively. For each economy the endowment shock is discretized into a 9 state Markov
chain and the asset position of the economy is approximated by a 75 point grid. The
investor’s wealth level is approximated using a 10 point grid, over which the solution
to the investor’s problem is linearly interpolated. The business cycles statistics of the
model are derived as follows: The model is simulated for 20, 000 periods. From these
20, 000 periods, sub-samples that have economy A staying in the credit market for 60
periods before going into a default are taken to compute the business cycles statistics
of the two economies. This process is repeated 5, 000 times, and the cycle statistics
are the average of the statistics derived from each of these repetitions.
4.1.2 Results
Table 2 describes the relevant business cycle statistics for Argentina and Uruguay for
the periods under study for (i) the entire period for which data is available and (ii) for
the year of the crisis.25 Additionally, in this table the results of the contagion model
are compared with the results of a simulation of the same model with risk neutral
investors. For comparison purposes, the risk neutral model has the same number of
endowment shocks and the same economies’ asset position as the contagion model.26
24Overall, the numerical analysis of the model shows that as long as X is not too large (i.e.
X < 100% of the emerging economy’s average income) the results of the model are not very sensitive
to the value of X .
25In the data the entire period under study before the default in 2001 corresponds a period with
74 quarters, therefore in the table the results of the model labeled as 74Q B.D. corresponds to the
results for 74 periods before a default, and the results labeled as 4Q B.D. correspond to the results
of 4 quarters before a default.
26The data for the business cycle statistics includes the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4 for the all of the
Argentinean series except the consumption series which is only available for the period 1993:Q1-
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Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics: The Model and the Data - Argentina.
Statistics Data No-F.Links F.Links
1983Q1-2001Q4 2001Q1-2001Q4 56 Quarters 4 Quarters 56 Quarters 4 Quarters
Before.Def. Before.Def. Before.Def. Before.Def.
mean (rA − rf ) % 12.67 22.26 2.05 9.92 5.70 12.40
mean (rU − rf ) % 8.53 9.53 1.57 1.57 6.00 10.97
std (rA − rf ) % 5.42 13.59 4.25 10.27 4.65 8.81
std (rU − rf ) % 1.33 1.45 3.98 3.98 8.87 3.30
corr (yA,rA − rf ) -0.60 -0.96 -0.28 -0.14 -0.16 -0.61
corr (yU ,rU − rf ) -0.30 -0.81 -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.21
corr (yA,rU − rf ) -0.24 -0.70 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.80
corr (yU ,rA − rf ) -0.44 -0.80 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.85
corr (rA − rf ,rU − rf ) 0.18 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.88
std (tb/y)A % 1.83 2.11 1.00 1.66 0.99 1.68
corr (yA, (tb/y)A) -0.59 -0.85 -0.41 -0.07 -0.39 -0.09
std (tb/y)U % 4.27 5.62 1.03 1.03 1.02 0.78
corr (yU , (tb/y)U ) -0.48 0.26 -0.33 -0.33 -0.29 -0.12
corr (W , cA) 0.60 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.84
corr (W , cU ) 0.42 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.25
corr (W , rA − rf ) -0.10 -0.71 0.00 0.00 -0.34 -0.80
corr (W , rU − rf ) -0.25 -0.88 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.90
Default ProbA % 0.74 1.12 1.12
Default ProbB | DA % 1.12 2.02
mean (−(b/y)A) % 53.30 8.86 12.31 8.80 12.24
mean-Con (−(b/y)U ) % 8.86 12.31 6.95 7.20
Table 2 shows that in general terms the contagion model fits the business cycle
statistics of Argentina and Uruguay relatively better than the model without financial
links (i.e. risk neutral investors). In the data, the spreads of Argentina are 12.67%
for the whole period, and 22.26% during the crisis period, i.e. the year previous to
2001:Q4. For the Uruguayan series, the period for which the data are available corresponds to
1988:Q1-2001:Q4 for output, consumption, and trade balance, and to 1980:Q1-2001:Q4 for the in-
terest rate. Therefore, the business cycle statistics for each variable correspond to the initial moment
at which each of them is available until the fourth quarter of 2001. The correlations are taken for the
common periods in which any pair of variables are available. Output and consumption for Argentina
and Uruguay are seasonally adjusted and are in logs and filtered with the H-P filter. Argentina and
Uruguay’s trade balances are reported as a percentage of their respective output. The interest
spread is defined as the difference between the Argentinean and the Uruguayan interest rate and the
yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill. For the Argentinean output, consumption, and trade balance, the
source of the data is the IFS. For the interest rate of Argentina, the source is Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). For Uruguay, the series for output, consumption, and trade balance are constructed using
the Uruguayan Central Bank quarterly and annual data on indexes and volume for these variables.
For Uruguay’s interest rate, the source is the Uruguayan Central Bank. This rate corresponds to
the domestic interest rate on loans, which is clearly not the interest rate on international loans, but
should be positively correlated. Unfortunately, there is no EMBI for Uruguay. (While it would be
possible to calculate an implicit interest rate from Uruguay’s debt service data, such data is available
only annually.)
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a default episode. The contagion model generates a spread for the overall period of
5.7% and a spread of 12.4% for the crisis period, while the model without financial
links only predicts a spread of 2.1% for the whole period and 9.9% for the crisis
period. Both models under-predict the volatility of the spreads and they do so by
nearly the same magnitude.
The better matching of the spreads by the contagion model is not the result of
a higher probability of default vis-a-vis the risk-neutral model, since both models
predict an annual probability of default of 4.5%. Also, the higher spreads of the
contagion model do not imply a contraction in the mean debt level since both models
have an unconditional mean debt level for the whole period of 8.9%, and in both
models the unconditional mean debt level for the crisis period increases to 12.3%.27
It is also interesting to note that conditional that there is going to be a default
episode by Country A, the probability of default by Country U is 0.9% larger per
year in the contagion model than in the model without financial links. This result of
the contagion model is consistent with the observed downgrading of the Uruguayan
external debt by international credit rating agencies that occurred in light of the
Argentinean crisis. Also, conditional that there is going to be a default episode by
Country A, the mean debt level for Country U is 6.95% for the whole period and 7.2%
for the year of the crisis.28 This result affirms that what is going on with Country A
has important effects on Country U’s access to credit markets.
With respect to the counter-cyclical behavior of spreads and trade balances, the
contagion model performs as well as the model without financial links and does better
in some cases for the crisis period. For example, in the data for the period of the
crisis, the correlation between Argentina’s spread and its GDP is −0.96. For this same
period, the correlation between the spread and the output predicted by the contagion
model is −0.61 while the model without financial links predicts this correlation to
27The level of debt supported at equilibrium here is larger compared to the results in Arellano
(2008). This difference may be due to the solution method employed as well as the dimension of
the grid used to expand the endowment shocks and the asset position of emerging economies. See
Hatchondo and Martinez (2006) for a discussion on the sensitivity of results to solution methods.
28The larger mean debt level that is observed during the periods of crisis reflects the debt dilution
effect of the crisis: with lower bond prices the economies are forced to incur higher levels of debt
during periods of economic distress.
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be only −0.14. Regarding the correlation between Argentina’s trade balance and
Argentina’s GDP for the whole period, in the data this correlation is −0.59 while
both models predict the correlation to be negative and around −0.40. Unfortunately,
for the period of the crisis, the correlations predicted by both models do not exhibit
the increased observed in the data for Argentina. However, they are still negative
albeit smaller than the the one in the data.
Regarding the correlations between the fundamentals of economies (A) and (U),
the contagion model is clearly superior to the model without financial links: when
the GDPs of the two countries are uncorrelated as assumed here, the model with-
out financial links predicts no correlation between the two economies’ fundamentals
(corr(yA,rU − rf), corr(yU ,rA− rf), and corr(rA− rf ,rU − rf) all equal to 0). On the
other hand, the contagion model predicts the correct sign for the fundamentals’ corre-
lation for both the entire period and for the crisis period. In terms of the correlation
between one country’s endowment and the other country’s spread, the correlation is
present for the whole period but largely underestimated, as the model predicts −0.03,
while the correlation in the data is −0.24. However for the period of crisis, the con-
tagion model does a much better job at explaining this correlation: in the data the
correlation is −0.70 while the model predicts it to be −0.80.
The contagion model also does very well with respect to the correlation between
the spreads of the two economies. For the whole period and during the crisis period,
the contagion model is consistent with the observed positive correlation of these two
variables. The contagion model is also consistent with the pattern observed in the
data of a significant increase in the correlation during the period of crisis. Both of
these correlations are over-predicted for the case of the domestic interest rates of
Argentina and Uruguay: in the data for the whole period, the correlation between
the spreads is 0.18 while the model predicts it to be 0.32; for the period of crisis, the
correlation is 0.52 in the data while the model predicts it to be 0.88.29
29While the correlation of the spreads is too high for the case studied here, Argentina and Uruguay,
it is in line with the observed correlation of Argentina with other developing countries for the
period 1994:Q3-2000:Q4. For example, the correlations predicted by the model are similar to the
ones observed for the EMBI+ pairs of Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Mexico, Argentina-Morocco,
Argentina-Nigeria, Argentina-South Africa, and Argentina-Venezuela. For 1994:Q3-2000:Q4, the
average correlation for these pairs is 0.87.
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The model is also able to reproduce relatively well the correlations between Ar-
gentina and Uruguay’s fundamentals and the wealth of international investors as
proxied by the GDP of the US. For example, in the data, there is a correlation of
−0.10 and −0.71 between Argentina’s spread and the GDP of the US during the
whole period and the period of the crisis respectively, while the model predicts this
correlation to be −0.34 and −0.80. Also, the correlations between investors’ wealth
and Argentina’s consumption for the whole period and for the period of crisis are 0.60
and 0.77 respectively, while the contagion model predicts these correlations to be 0.31
and 0.84. The model with risk neutral investors cannot reproduce this behavior.
Finally, for the model without financial links the business cycle statistics of the
country that is not at the verge of a default are independent of the outlook of the
country in crisis. On the other hand, for the model with financial links this is not the
case. The model predicts the spread of Uruguay to be 6.00% for the whole period
and increase to 10.97% in the year before default compared to 8.53% and 9.53%
respectively in the data; also the model predicts the correlation of Uruguay’s spreads
with the US GDP to increase during the year before the Argentinean default from
−0.15 to −0.9 which is consistent with the movement in the data from −0.25 to
−0.88.
5 Conclusion
The empirical literature in international finance presents evidence that points to a
very relevant role for the fundamentals of other emerging countries in the determina-
tion of sovereign credit spreads and capital flows to emerging economies. The model
in this paper is the first model that endogenously determines sovereign bond prices
and at the same time endogenously accounts for contagion of crises.
The endogenization of bond prices and contagion occurs in two ways. First, the
consideration of enforcement problems in sovereign debt contracts allows default risk
and default incentives to be endogenized; therefore sovereign bond prices can be de-
termined endogenously by the model. Second, the assumption of DARA for investors
allows for endogenous financial links across economies that share investors. Together,
these two elements build a framework that explains the contagion of crises. The intu-
ition for contagion is as follows: whenever a negative shock occurs in one country, this
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shock increases the risk associated with that country; this increase in risk implies ex-
pected future negative wealth shocks for investors. Given DARA, investors’ tolerance
toward risk decreases following the wealth shock, leading to a portfolio recomposition.
Investors shift away from risky investments towards less risky ones.
Qualitatively the results of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence
of contagion from Argentina to Uruguay: First, sovereign spreads and capital flows
to emerging economies are positively correlated across economies. Second, the funda-
mentals of foreign emerging economies affect the determination of domestic sovereign
spreads and capital flows. Third, the average financing conditions of an economy are
less favorable after other countries have defaulted.
Quantatively implementation of the current model faces two primary hurdles, first,
the discontinuity of the default decisions, and second, the high dimension of the state
space of the model. The problem of the high dimensionality of the state might be
overcome if the steepness of the pricing function could be reduced: currently, prices
respond too strongly to changes in the economy’s debt level. (Eventhough the price
function is made less steep by endogenizing financial links.) Therefore it is necessary
to have very fine grids for the asset position of the economies in order to capture a
great deal of the default action. This need, if satisfied, has an explosive effect on the
dimensionality of the state space of the model.
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Appendix A - Proofs
The following proofs assume permanent exclusion of credit markets after a default.
Under this assumption the value function of default is independent of γL, and W .
The quantitative analysis of the model generalizes the results to the case of temporary
exclusion. We focus in b′j < 0 (only in this situation is default possible), and the
equilibrium of the credit market implies ϑ′j = −b
′
j > 0. More borrowing implies a
more negative b′j .
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the emerging economies’ incentives to default increase.
Proof. Considering the case in which the government has not defaulted and
assuming an interior solution for the allocation to the emerging economy j’s asset the
first order condition of the investor’s problem is
φ
(
ϑ′j
)
= E
{
−qjvc
(
cL
(
ϑ′j
))
+ βvc
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j
))
d′j
}
= 0.
Because the periodic utility of the international investor is of the CRRA type
and γL1 < γ
L
2 , then there exists a concave function ψ (·) such that v2
(
c; γL2
)
=
ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
. If ϑ′j,1 is the optimal allocation when γ
L = γL1 , and ϑ
′
j,2 is the op-
timal allocation when γL = γL2 then it holds that
φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= E
{
−qjv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,1
))
+ βv1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,1
))
d′j
}
= 0.
φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= E
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−qjv2,c
(
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(
ϑ′j,2
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+ βv2,c
(
c′L
(
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d′j
}
= 0.
Using v2
(
c; γL2
)
= ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
it is possible to define
φ2
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= Eψ′
[
v1
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cL(ϑ
′
j,1
)
)
] {
−qv1,c
(
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(
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where
Υ(ϑ′j) =
ψ′
[
v
(
c′L(ϑ
′
j
)
)
]
ψ′
[
v
(
cL(ϑ′j
)
)
] , Υ(ϑ′j) > 0 and Υ′(ϑ′j) < 0.30
The last inequality comes from the fact that both Υ(ϑ′j) and ψ
′
(
ϑ′j
)
are positive
and decreasing. The inclusion of these functions in the previous equation implies
that φ2
(
ϑ′j,1
)
is lower than φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
because Υ′(ϑ′j) and ψ
′
(
ϑ′j
)
give little weight to
the realizations of d ′j = 1, and high weight to the realizations of d
′
j = 0. Therefore
φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
> φ2
(
ϑ′j,1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and the risk of default δj , φ
(
ϑ′j
)
is
a decreasing function and as a consequence ϑ′j,2 < ϑ
′
j,1 which in equilibrium implies
b′j,2 > b
′
j,1.
Then for any state of the world S, taking as given qj and (δj), a higher γ
L would
result in the investor allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to each of the
economies’ sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is less risk averse there
are financial contracts that are available to each emerging economy which are not
available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently given qj and δj then
V Cj,1
(
S; γL1
)
≥ V Cj,2
(
S; γL2
)
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on γL,
it is clear that if for some S, default is optimal for economy j when γL = γL1 , then for
the same S default would be optimal when γL = γL2 . Additionally, because incentives
to default would be higher whenever γL = γL2 , than when γ
L = γL1 at equilibrium
δj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
> δj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
, and therefore qj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
< qj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
.
Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative in-
vestor. For all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj, given
W2 then default will be optimal for bj for the same states yj, given W1 therefore
30Taking as given the portfolio allocations of the investor to other emerging economies the deriva-
tive of Υ(ϑ′j) is given by
Υ′(ϑ′j) =
ψ′′[v(c′L(ϑ
′
j))]vc(c
′
L(ϑ
′
j))
∂c′L(ϑ
′
j)
∂ϑ′
j
− ψ′′[v(cL(ϑ
′
j))]vc(cL(ϑ
′
j))
∂cL(ϑ
′
j)
∂ϑ′
j
Υ(ϑ′j)
ψ′
[
v
(
cL(ϑ′j
)
)
] < 0.
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Dj
(
bj | W2, ψ, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
⊆ Dj
(
bj |W1, ψ, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
Proof. Because the periodic utility of the international investor exhibit DARA
v
(
W1, ϑ
′
j
)
is a concave transformation of v
(
W2, ϑ
′
j
)
so if ϑ′j,1 is the optimal allocation
whenW = W1, and ϑ
′
j,2 is the optimal allocation whenW = W2, it is possible to define
v1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= v
(
W1, ϑ
′
j,1
)
and v2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= v
(
W2, ϑ
′
j,2
)
, where v1
(
ϑ′j
)
= ψ
(
v2
(
ϑ′j
))
. The
first order conditions of the investor are
φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= E
{
−qjv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,1
))
+ βv1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,1
))
dj
′
}
= 0,
φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= E
{
−qjv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,2
))
+ βv2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,2
))
dj
′
}
= 0,
and therefore
φ1
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= Eψ′
[
v2
(
ϑ′j,2
)] {
−qjv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,2
))
+ βΥ(ϑ′j,2)v2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,2
))
dj
′
}
< 0.
Υ(ϑ′) is defined as before, and as before the inequality comes from the fact that
Υ(ϑ′j) and ψ
′(ϑ′j) are both positive and decreasing. Therefore φ1
(
ϑ′j,2
)
< φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
.
Again the concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and δj, φ
(
ϑ′j
)
is a decreasing
function, and as consequence ϑ′j,2 > ϑ
′
j,1 which in equilibrium implies b
′
j,2 < b
′
j,1.
Then for any S and taking as given qj and δj , a lower level of W would result in
this agent allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to the emerging economies’
sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is more wealthy there are financial
contracts that are available to the emerging economy that are not available when
the investor is less wealthy. Consequently, given qj and δj then V
C
j,1 (S−W ;W2) ≥
V Cj,2 (S−W ;W1).
31
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on W ,
it is clear that if for some bj in some states yj, default is optimal when W =W2, then
for the same states yj default would be optimal when W = W1. Because incentives
to default would be higher whenever W = W1, than when W = W2 at equilibrium
δj (S, bj
′;W ′1) > δ (S, bj
′;W ′2), and therefore q (s, bj
′;W ′1) < q (s, bj
′;W ′2).
31S−W corresponds to all the state variables of the world except for the wealth level of the investors.
43
Proposition 3 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Proposition 1 implies that
if economy k in the investor’s portfolio defaults, then for economy j which is also in
the investor’s portfolio, incentives to default increase.
Proof. If economy k defaults on her debts with the investor, the wealth of econ-
omy k will be (W | dk = 0) = θ
TB′ +
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m, which is lower than her wealth if she
decides not to default, which is (W | dk = 1) = θ
TB′ +
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m + θ
′
k. Therefore
V Cj
(
yj, bj , {ym}
J
m=1 , {bm}
J
m=1 , (W | dk=1)
)
> V Cj
(
yj, bj , {ym}
J
m=1 , {bm}
J
m=1 , (W | dk=0)
)
which implies that emerging economy j′s incentives to default are larger when some
economy k which shares investors defaults.
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Appendix B - Solution Method
This model is solved for the case of N = 2. The state space of the model is discretized
for the state variables of the model, b1, b2, y1, y2,W . y1 and y2 are approximated with a
discrete Markov chain with 9 possible realizations. b1 and b2 take 75 possible discrete
values. W , takes 5 possible discrete values. Interpolating over the grid points on W ,
we allow a continuous range for W.
Because countries are identical except for the current realization of their endow-
ment, the quantitative problem presented by this model is symmetric. Symmetry
implies that it is only required to solve the model for one country since the policy
functions of the two countries are identical. The solution algorithm has the following
steps:
(i) Make an initial guess for the governments’ value function, V 0j (S), next period
asset position, b′,0j (S), default/repayment decision d
0
j (S), and equilibrium price
function q
APC,(0)
j (S).
(ii) Taking b
′∗,(−i)
j (S) , d
∗,(−i)
j (S) and q
APC(−i)
j (S) as given, and assuming equilib-
rium in emerging credit markets given by
θ
′∗,(i)
j (S) =
{
b
′∗,(−i)
j (S) if b
′∗,(−i)
j (S) < 0
0 if b
′∗,(−i)
j (S) ≥ 0
,
solve the investor’s problem to find her value function V L(i) (S) and her optimal
policy function W ′∗,(i) (S).
(iii) Solve the problem of the governments to find their value function V
(i)
j (S), their
optimal policy functions b
′∗,(i)
j (S) , and d
∗,(i)
j (S) and the new equilibrium price
functions q
EE(i)
j
(
S; b
′(i)
j (S)
)
. This maximization involves the following sub-
steps:
(a) Take q
APC,(−i)
j (S), b
′∗,(−i)
−j and W
′∗,(i) (S) as given to compute
c
(i)
L
(
S; b′j, b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
.
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(b) Given c
(i)
L
(
S; b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
and W ′∗,(i) (S), compute
A(i)
(
S; b′j, b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
=
βL
∫
y∗j (b
′
j |S
′∗(i))
∫
y∗−j(b
′
−j |S
′∗(i))
(
cL
′
)−γL
f
(
y′j | yj
)
f
(
y′−j | y−j,
)
dy′jdy
′
−j
(c) For any S, b′j , b
′
−j solve for q
(i)
j
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
by solving the non-linear equa-
tion on q
(i)
j
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
that is derived from (9b):
qj
(
s, b′j, b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)−γL
−
b′jA
(i)
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
qj
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
− c˜
(i)
L
(
S; b′j, b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
A(i)
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
= 0
where c˜
(i)
L
(
S; b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
= X +W −W ′∗,(i)qf + b−j − b
′∗,(−i)
−j − b
′
jq
f .
(d) For any S, b′j given b
′∗,(−i)
−j ,W
′∗,(i) (s) compute
β
∫
yj
∫
y−j
V
C(i)
j
(
S; b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
f
(
y′j | yj
)
f
(
y′−j | y−j
)
dy′jdy
′
−j.
(e) Maximize
u
(
yj + bj − b
′
jqj
(
S, b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
))
+
β
∫
yj
∫
y−j
V
C(i)
j
(
S; b′j , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
f
(
y′j | yj
)
f
(
y′−j | y−j
)
dy′jdy
′
−j.
with respect to b′j to find V
C(i)
j (S) and the associated b
′∗,(i)
j (S) and
q
(i)
j
(
S, b
′(i)
j (S) , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
.
(f) Determine d
∗,(i)
j (s) by comparing V
C(i)
j (S) to V
D
j .
(g) Determine the equilibrium price of bonds by setting
q
EE(i)
j
(
S; b
′(i)
j (S) , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
=
{
q
(i)
j
(
S, b′(i) (S) , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
if d
(i)
j (S) = 1,
0 otherwise.
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(iv) If
∣∣∣qEE(i)j (S; b′(i)j (S) , b′∗,(−i)−j )− qAPC,(−i)j (S; b′(−i)j (S) , b′∗,(−i)−j )∣∣∣ < ε stop.
Otherwise, set
q
APC,(i)
j
(
S; b
′(i)
j (S) , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
= q
EE(i)
j
(
S; b
′(i)
j (S) , b
′∗,(−i)
−j
)
,
and repeat steps 2 to 4.
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